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Este artículo analiza como las autoridades españolas de la
competencia se van a ver implicadas en la aplicación del derecho
comunitario de la competencia debido al impacto de la
modernización de la legislación comunitaria para la aplicación del
régimen del Tratado de Roma para las ententes y los abusos de
posición dominante. existen una serie de problemas a resolver
14 ALFONSO-LUIS CALVO C., MARÍA PILAR CANEDO A., NATIVIDAD GOÑI U.
SUMMARY
I.  Introduction
II. Organization of the spanish NCA
A Bodies
B The powers of inspection
III. Description of the procedure
IV. Question of the modernization from the spanish perspective
A. About the national authorities
B About the allocation of the cases and the suspension of
proceedings
como la posibilidad de forum shopping y el respeto al principio ne
bis idem.
Palabras clave: Derecho comunitario de la competencia. Forum
shopping, derecho internacional privado.
ABSTRACT
In this paper we are going to deal with the impact of the
community antitrust modernisation in Spain. the present
paper starts describing the spanish competition system and
goes on to analyse different aspects of the impact of community
modernisation. from an institutional point of view spanish
legal system is well positioned to implement the new european
model of control of the practices against the competition but
an important group of problems are now without solution.
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shopping, international private law.
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In this paper we are going to deal with the impact of the Community
Antitrust Modernisation in Spain. The present paper starts describing
the Spanish competition system and goes on to analyse different aspects
of the impact of Community modernisation.
The Spanish Law of competition is inspired by the Community
competition Law from its beginnings, even before Spain became a party
of the European Communities1. Now, the Competition Act of July 17th
of 1989, of Defence of Competition (from now on Spanish Competition
Act) copies the Community Competition Law, and mainly, the articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty2.
In this way, the Spanish Law prohibits agreements, decisions by
associations of undertakings or concerted practices which restrict
competition in all or any part of the domestic market in similar terms to
those of the article 81 of the Treaty (Article1 of the Spanish Competition
Act). It also lays down the possibility for the parties who are involved
1 Already the Law 110/63, of 20th July, of Protection against Restrictive Practices of
Competition it is based mainly on the articles contained in the Treaty.
2 Vid. S. HIERRO ANIBARRO, “La evolución de los órganos españoles de defensa de la
competencia desde la perspectiva del derecho comunitario”, Noticias de la Unión
Europea, 2003, pp. 65-76.
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in an agreement to obtain an individual exemption from the previous
prohibition when the agreement fulfils many conditions which are exactly
the same foreseen in Article 81 section 3 of the Treaty (Article 3 of the
Spanish Competition Act).
Moreover, any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position shall be prohibited by Spanish Competition rules (Article 6 of
the Spanish Competition Act) in similar terms to those of Article 82 of
the Treaty.
In other subjects, Spanish law doesn’t copy the European law, but
ours integrates it. This is the case of the application of the Spanish
equivalent to article 81 section 3 of the Treaty to agreements of the
category3. Indeed, the Competition Act refers this matter to the European
regulations on agreements of the category exemptions. According to
the provisions of Spanish Competition Act from, July 17th from 1989
(Article 5.1 a)), vertical agreements related only to the Spanish market,
are authorised provided that they comply with the provisions established
in Commission Block Exemptions Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999, of
22nd of December 1999 on application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty
to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, or in those
Community Regulations that substitute it, and in Commission Block
Exemptions Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002, of 31st of July 2002 on
application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical
agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, or in
those Community Regulations that substitute it. Similar solutions are
provided for Technology Transfer agreements, Horizontal agreements
and agreements in the Insurance sector.
Spanish Competition Authorities even interpret the Competition Act
in exactly the same way that the Commission applies Community Law.
In consequence, most of Spanish notions of Competition Law are the
3 Real Decreto 378/2003, of March 28th, developing the Law 16/1989, of july 17th,
of Defence of the Competition, as regards excuses for categories, singular
authorization and registration of defence of the competition, (BOE n. 90, of 15th
april).
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same as European concepts. Spanish Authorities have copied the notion
of abuse of dominant position, and their application to related markets4.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE SPANISH NCA
A. BODIES
Anyway, the application of the Spanish Competition Act, (which aims
to ensure for the constitutional economic order in the market economy
with a view to defending the public interests) is entrusted to the following
administrative bodies: The Spanish Competition Court (Tribunal de
Defensa de la Competencia), with the functions of legal ruling and, in
some cases, proposals, and the Competition Service (Servicio de
Defensa de la Competencia), in charge of instructing the proceedings.
On the one hand, the Competition Service is attached to the Ministry
of Economy and its functions are, among others, to instruct the
proceedings for conduct included in the Competition Act, to co-operate
on the issue of competition with foreign bodies and international
institutions and to carry out the tasks of collaboration between the
Spanish Administration and the European Commission to apply Articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty in Spain (Article 31, letters a, f and g of the
Spanish Competition Act)5.
The Spanish Competition Court, on the other hand, is the main Body
of the system of Spanish defence of competition. Although it is attached
4 Vid. Res. TDC 11 november 1997, Relojes Rolex.
5 It has also other functions as the to vouch for the execution and compliance with the
resolutions adopted in applying the Spanish Competition Act, to keep the
Competition Defence Register, to study and carry out research on the economic
sectors, analysing the situation and degree of competition present in each one of
them, as well as the possible existence of practices that restrict competition. As a
result of the studies and research that is carried out, it may propose the adoption of
measures to remove the obstacles on which the restriction is based. Finally, it may
inform, provide advisory services and proposals on the matter of restrictive
agreements and practices, the concentration and association of undertakings, the
degree of competition in the internal and external market in comparison with the
domestic market and on the other issues pertaining to competition defence (Article
31 letters b, c, d, of Spanish Competition Act).
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to the Ministry of Economy, it is configured as an autonomous Body,
with a differentiated public legal personality and autonomous
management so it enjoys full independence in the exercise of its functions6.
Spanish Competition Court functions are to settle and issue reports on
competition issues, to apply in Spain Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty
and its developing Laws and to require the Competition Service to
instruct proceedings (Article 25, letters a, c and f of the Spanish
Competition Act)7.
Passing now to other matters, lets go now through the Powers of the
Spanish Bodies:
Firstly, the procedure shall be initiated by the Service ex officio or
at the request of the interested party. The same as the European
Commission, the Competition Service may agree not to initiate
proceedings derived from presumably committing the acts prohibited
by the Law, when it considers that the behaviour do not have a significant
effect on the competition conditions due to their relative unimportance8.
Equally, the Spanish Competition Court, once the proceedings have
been submitted, will decide on their admission by considering if the
relevant background has been supplied by the Competition Service.
This is call in Spanish Law principio de oportunidad de investigación
(Articles 36, section 1, letter a and Article 39 of the Spanish Competition
Act).
6 Article 63 of the Law 24/2001, of december 27th, of Tax, Administrative and
Labour measures has modified the legal nature of the Competition Court and now
it becomes an autonomous organism. The Competition Court has now its own
statute, vid. RD 864/2003, of july 4, for which the Statute of the Competition Court
is approved, (BOE n. 161, 10th july).
7 Other important functions of the Competition Court are the following: to authorize
the agreements prohibited by Article 1 of the Spanish Competition Act in the cases
and according to the requirements foreseen in Article 3 of the Spanish Competition
Act, to inform on the economic concentration transactions with community
dimensions, to rule the projects to open large commercial outlets, to carry out
arbitration functions and to draw up reports on compensation for damages (Article
25 letters b, d, and, g, h of the Spanish Competition Act).
8 Case T-24/90, 18 september 1992, Automec v. Commission, ECR.1992/II, p. 2223.
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B. THE POWERS OF INSPECTION
a) Secondly, the investigation powers of the Spanish administrative
bodies are equally similar to those of the European Commission: This
way, in the course of their inspections, the officials may examine, obtain
copies or take extracts from books and documents, including accountancy
documents, on any material support, and if necessary, retain them for a
maximum of ten days. On the contrary, the European Commission may
not retain documents but may seal them, for the period and to the extend
necessary for the inspection (Article 20.2 of the Regulation 1/2003). In
the course of the inspections, under the Spanish Law the officials may
also ask for explanations in situ (Article 33.2 of the Spanish Competition
Act9) but the Competition Act does not specify who could be asked and
the subject of the questions. In contrast to the Spanish Law, the
Regulation 1/2003, states that any representative or member of staff of
the undertaking or association of undertakings may be asked during the
inspection for explanations on facts or documents linked with to the
subject-matter and purpose of the inspections (Article 20.2 Regulation
1/2003). Besides, the Competition Act does not state if the answers can
be recorded either. All these powers of inspection under the Competition
Act have been modified by the Law December the 30th 2003, with the
purpose of adapting the Spanish legislation to the Regulation 1/2003. In
the Regulation 1/2003 and under Spanish Law access to premises may
be made with the consent of the occupants or by means of a court order
(Article 34 of the Spanish Competition Act).
Moreover, a proposal of Real Decreto sets up devices for
cooperation between the Competition Service and the competition
authorities of other Member States for the application of the articles 81
and 82 of the Treaty. It will enter into force the first of May of this year.
It says that Competition Service may in its own territory carry out
inspection under Competition Act on behalf and for the account of the
9 This Article has been modified by the Law 62/2003, of 30th December in order to
adapt Spanish Law to the new model.
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competition authority of another Member State in order to establish
whether there has been an infringement or not of articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty10.
After talking about the powers of inspection it is time to deal with
the fines which can be imposed by the Court.
b) Fines.
The Spanish Competition Court, like the European Commission may
impose fines of up to 6.010,12 euros to those undertakings who
intentionally or through negligence, fail to provide data or information
or do so in an incomplete or inaccurate way. The Director of the
Competition Service, on the other hand, may sanction them with
coercive fines of between 60,10 and 3.005,06 euros for every day’s
delay in observing the duty to provide the data and information in the
term referred to in the Spanish Competition Act (Articles 29.2 and
32.2 Spanish Competition Act).
The Commission may impose higher fines, up to 1% of the total
turnover in the preceding business year when undertakings supply
incorrect or misleading information or up to 5% of the average daily
turnover in the preceding business year per day in order to compel
them to supply complete and correct information which has been
required (Article 23, section 1 of Regulation 1/2003)11.
The Spanish Competition Court may, like the European Commission,
impose on the undertakings, that have either deliberately or through
negligence breached the prohibition of agreements or abuse of a dominant
position which restrict competition, fines of up to 901.518,16 euros,
amount which may be increased up to 10 percent of the turnover
corresponding to the financial year immediately prior to the Court
decision.
However, the Spanish Competition Act may also sanction the
offenders, in the case of a legal entity, its legal representatives or the
10 Article 6 of the proposal of a Real Decreto about the application of European
Competition Law in Spain, www.mineco.es/dgdc/sdc (last acces may 2004).
11 This Article has been also modified by the Law 62/2003, of 30th december in order
to adapt Spanish Law to the new model.
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members of the management bodies that have intervened in the
agreement or decision with a fine up to 30.050,61 euros.
But the competence of the Spanish Competition Service and the
Competition Court for applying the Spanish Competition Act has been
restricted by the Constitutional Court.
In 2002 was adopted the Act of February the 21st, which constitutes
the framework of a decentralised system of enforcement of the
Competition Act. The new regulation implies, due to a Constitutional
Court decision, the major administrative reform in the current institutional
design of the Spanish competition system.
The Constitutional Court judgement issued on 11th of November
1999, acknowledges that the Autonomous Communities have executive
powers in the enforcement of the competition legislation12. Nonetheless,
the exercise of these powers must be reconciled with the need to protect
the unity of the national economy and the demand for a single market
that can allow the State to develop its constitutional powers in laying
down and co-ordinating the general plans for economic activity in the
interests of respecting the equality of the basic conditions for the exercise
of economic activity.
The Act 1/2002 is the result of that mandate and it came into force
on May 23, 200213. The main elements and effects of this Act are the
following:
12 STC núm 208/1999 (Sala Segunda), 11th november 1999, vid. B. BELANDO GARÍN,
“Defensa de la competencia y comercio interior (Comentario a la Sentencia del TC
208/1999, de 11 noviembre 1999”, Civitas Revista Española de Derecho
Administrativo, n° 106, 2000, p. 271; P. BIGLINO CAMPOS, “Principio de competencia,
inconstitucionalidad y nulidad a la luz de la STC 208/1999 (RTC 1999, 208), sobre
la Ley 16/1989 de Defensa de la competencia” Revista Española de Derecho
Constitucional, n° 59/2000 (mayo-agosto 2000), pp. 303-330; S. MARTÍNEZ LAGE,
“La sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional de 11 de noviembre de 1999”, Gaceta
Jurídica de la CE, nº 205/2000, pp. 3-9.
13 It is a very controversial judgement because four judges of the Constitutional Court
cast a vote running counter the majority opinion setting out their reasons for
withholding assent. Vid. STC núm. 208/1999 (Sala Segunda), 11th november 1999.
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• The Autonomous Communities have only competences in the
enforcement of the Spanish Competition Law concerning
anticompetitive practices: agreements and abuse of dominant
position. So, Competition legislation, Merger control, Public aids
control and the approval of block exemption regulations are still
exclusively State competences. Institutional representation before
international organizations and the enforcement of articles 81 and
82 of the Treaty are State competences as well.
• The Autonomous Communities will be competent in proceedings
when the conduct produces effects only in their territories and there
is no a national market effect. This implies that the State remains
competent for prosecuting practices that may alter free competition
in the supra-autonomous sphere or in the national market as a whole.
• And the Autonomous Communities will set up their own institutions
to develop their competences in relation to antitrust practices. At
the end, this will mean an important increase in resources devoted
to maintain competition in markets.
In consequence, the matter which concerns everybody is that, the
Spanish Competition Service and the Competition Court are the only
Competition Authorities in the sense of the Regulation 1/2003 on the
implementation of articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. We can conclude
that the decentralised system of enforcement of certain articles of
the Competition Act should not affect the modernization of the
implementation of articles. 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Only these two
Spanish administrative bodies, the Court and the Service have the power
to apply those articles of the Treaty14.
Nowadays the Autonomous Communities are creating their bodies
for the application of the Competition Act. Right now only Catalonia
14 Vid. Art. 1.5, letter d) of the Law 1/2002, of February 21, of Coordination of the
Competitions of the State and the Autonomous Communities (BOE n. 22 February
46 2002).
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has created the Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia
de la Generalitat that will instruct the proceedings and the Tribunal
Catalán Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia (from now on
TCDC) in charge of settling the proceedings15.
Although the TCDC has not the power for the application of the
arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the TCDC sent a contribution in response
to the public consultation on the “Modernization Package” and requested
its participation in the cooperation mechanisms, that means, in the
European Network of Competition, in order to the uniform application
of the community law in the framework of its powers.
The TCDC alleges that if the Court is not in the European Network
of Competition it would not be possible to ensure the due, effective
and uniform application of articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Those are
objectives in the Regulation for the implementation of the articles 81
and 82 of the Treaty. And those objectives are a limitation to the
institutional and procedural autonomy principle of the Member
States in the adoption of the necessary measures for the implementation
of the Community Law16. This principle is settled down in art. 35 of the
Regulation for the implementation of articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty17.
15 Vid. Real Decreto 222/2002, of August the 27th, creating the bodies for the defence
of competition of the Generalitat de Cataluña, DOGC nº 3711, september the 2nd
2002, p. 15471.
16 Comments of the Tribunal Catalán de Defensa de la Competencia de la Generalitat
de Cataluña to the modernization package. Tribunal Catalán de Defensa de la
Competencia http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/
procedural_rules/comments/ (Last acces 20-05-2004).
17 This article set up that the Member States shall designate the Competition Authority
or Authorities responsible for the application of articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in
such a way that the provisions of this regulation are effectively complied with. The
measures necessary to empower those authorities to apply those Articles shall be
taken before the one of May 2004.
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III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURE
The procedure foreseen in the Spanish Competition Court begins in the
Competition Service in charge of instructing the cases which afterwards
will be solved by the Court.
A. The procedure in cases being dealt with by the Competition
Protection Service has three phases: initiation, instruction and
termination.
a) Firstly, proceedings are initiated by the Competition Protection
Service upon its own initiative or upon the application of an
interested party. The accusations under the Competition Act are
public, any person may carry it out be they an interested party or
not (Article 36, section 1, paragraph 2nd Spanish Competition
Act). This is a difference with the provisions of the Regulation 1/
2003. The service may conduct a confidential investigation before
taking any public step.
b) An investigating officer is appointed for each case, and the parties
are notified accordingly.
c) The mentioned notice is published in the Official Gazette
(BOE) and if it is convenient in a national daily newspaper, or in
the daily with the largest circulation in the province where the
disputed practice took place. The purpose of this notice is to
enable interested parties to supply information to the Service.
d) Secondly, the Service takes all appropriate investigative steps in
order to clarify the facts and identify those responsible.
e) When the Service has established the facts it sends a statement of
objections to those who are supposed to be responsible, who
must reply within 15 days and may quote evidence in their
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defence. They are free to make additional submissions at any
time.
f) Finally, the Service draws up a report which is sent to the
Competition Court by the Service itself. The report sets out the
facts, describes their effects and proposes an assessment.
g) The Service may also decide not to proceed further. Such decisions
may be appealed before the Court.
B. Proceedings before the Competition Court also has several stages:
a) Firstly the Competition Court receives the report from the SDC
Competition Protection Service, and decides within five days
whether or not to admit it.
b) The second stage consist of the taking of evidence: the parties
may cite evidence and request that a hearing take place within
15 days from the date on which the Court admitted the case.
c) Afterwards, the Court agrees to a hearing if it considers it is
necessary. Otherwise it gives the parties 15 days to make their
submissions.
d) After the hearing, or after receiving the submissions, the Court
may order verification of certain items of evidence. It may also
hear the investigating officer at the Competition Protection
Service.
e) And finally, once these proceedings have been completed the
Tribunal must take a decision within 20 days.
f) The Court’s decisions may be appealed before the administrative
courts, the Audiencia Nacional.
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IV. QUESTION OF THE MODERNIZATION FROM THE SPANISH
PERSPECTIVE
A. ABOUT THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
In Spain, at the moment, the Competition Service and the Competition
Court are the only Spanish administrative authorities that may apply the
articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty18. However, Spain could designate
another authorities before the 1 May of 2004, by virtue of the art. 35.1
Regulation 1/2003. for example the authorities of the Comunidades
Autónomas19.
Other Administrative Bodies, such as the Telecommunications
Commission Market has the function of protecting the defence of
competition in the Telecommunication Market. However it cannot apply
Spanish Competition Act or European Competition Law. The
Telecommunications Commission Market informs the Competition
Service of actions, agreements, practices and behaviours contrary to
the Spanish Competition Act and might ask it to initiate proceedings20.
18 The Spanish Telecommunications Market Commission may adopt the necessary
measures to safeguard a plural offer of services, access to electronic networks to
operators, networks interconnection and the running of networks under open
networks conditions; as well as the pricing and marketing policies implemented by
the agents in the sector. To do so, the Telecommunications Market Commission
may lay down binding Instructions for the entities operating in the electronic
communications market. These Instructions must be published in Spain’s Official
State Journal. It may also inform the Spanish Competition Service of actions,
agreements, practices and behaviours contrary to the Spanish Competition Act.
But it cannot itself apply Spanish Competition Act or European Competition Law
(Article 48, section 3, letter e of the Telecommunications General Act, Act 32/2003
of 3 november 2003, BOE num. 264, of 4 november 2003).
19 Vid. Art. 1.5, letter d) of the Law 1/2002, of february 21, of Coordination of the
Competitions of the State and the Autonomous Communities (BOE n. 22 february
46 2002). The TCDC neither any other autonomous competition authorities could
apply the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
20 Article 28 of the Real Decreto 1994/1996, of September the 6th, which develops
the Act 12/1997, of april the 24th, for the Liberalization of the Telecommunications
Market (B.O.E. n. 6/1996 de 25.09.96). Vid. Res. 1 April 2004, Astel/Telefónica,
Expte. 557/03.
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B. ABOUT THE ALLOCATION OF THE CASES
AND THE SUSPENSION OF PROCEEDINGS
The Spanish national authorities obligated by the principles of allocation
of cases, settled down in art. 11. 6 of the Regulation 1/2003 are the ones
in charge of the preparation and the adoption of the types of decisions
foreseen in article 5 of the Regulation. Whenever it intervenes in first
instance (art. 35.3 in fine). Therefore, only the Competition Service and
the Competition Court are affected by Article 11, section 6 of the
Regulation 1/2003 and not the administrative courts, as the Audiencia
Nacional, because this Court deals with the appeals regarding the
decisions of the Competition Court. In consequence, the Competition
Service will not be able to file a procedure in application of the Articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty when the Commission has initiate a procedure;
and, in the case the procedure was already initiated by the Competition
Service or already before the Competition Court; these two authorities
may suspend it if the European Commission initiates its own procedure.
This question is already settled in the Articles 44.1 and 56 of the
Competition Act so the new Regulation does not affect the Spanish
practice at all21. But now, by virtue of the Article 13, section 1 of the
Regulation 1/2003 these Spanish bodies will also be able to suspend the
proceedings before them or to reject the complaint on the ground (on the
basis of) that one competition authority of a Member State is dealing with
the case22.
C. THE INDIVIDUAL EXEMPTION
It is widely known that the new community procedure is based on a
system of directly applicable legal exception. That is why, Article 1
21 Vid. Res. TDC of November the 3rd 2003, REPSOL/Estaciones de Servicio, (AC2004/
52), Res. TDC of November the 11th 1997, Relojes Rolex (AC1997/2379).
22 Communication of the Commission on the cooperation in the Net of competition
Authorities, p. 24.
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paragraph 2 of Regulation 1/2003 settle down that “Agreements,
decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty
which satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall not be
prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required.” On the other
hand article 10 settle down that “Where the Community public interest
relating to the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty so requires,
the Commission, acting on its own initiative, may by decision find that
Article 81 of the Treaty is not applicable to an agreement, a decision by
an association of undertakings or a concerted practice, either because
the conditions of Article 81(1) of the Treaty are not fulfilled, or because
the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty are satisfied. The Commission
may likewise make such a finding with reference to Article 82 of the
Treaty”23.
By these two articles we can conclude that the system of notifications
and individual exemptions has disappeared of the community procedure
with the advantages and inconveniences that this change implies24. We
can talk about less formalism and less handling charge for the parties in
the administrative procedure before the Commission and on the other
hand we must take into account a decrease in the legal certainty that
the system implies that can impose a cost in itself for the companies.
Independently of the valuation or appraisal that this system deserves
in our opinion, we have to show the situation and specially the problems
that this modification implies in the Spanish legal order.
23 See also the Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission
under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty Official Journal C 101, 27.04.2004, pp.
65-77, the Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions
concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance
letters) Official Journal C 101, 27.04.2004, pp. 78-80.
24 Among others, vid. C. FOURGOUX, “Un nouvel Antitrust européen. Espoirs et
craintes”, Revue de Jurisprudence Commerciale, 2001, pp. 51-65; W. JAEGER, “Die
möglichen auswirkungen einer Reform des EG-Wettbewerbsrechts für die nationales
Gerichte”, Wirtschaft und Wetwebwerb 2000, nº 11, pp. 1063-1075; K. HOLMES,
“The EC White Paper on Modernisation”, World Competition, nº 23, 4, 2000, pp.
51-79; M. MONTI, “The international Dimension of Competition Policy”, Fordham
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, 31 de octubre de
2002, p. 5; M. MONTI, “European Competition for the 21st Century”, Fordham
International Law Journal, junio 2001.
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As we have just analysed in the first part of this work, our legal
system is directly and expressly based on the Community regime both
in relation to the legal aspect or statutory scheme and also in relation to
the application and interpretation of all concepts which are used in our
legal practice and theory. That is the reason why, Article 1 of our
Competition Act and Article 81 of the Treaty have equivalent content
and why Article 6 of our Competition Act is coincident with Art. 82 of
the Treaty.
Directly based in the Community legal order when it was created,
our internal law permits the possibility to grant exemptions from the
prohibition of the agreements when the practices complete a group of
conditions. These conditions are exactly the same as those in paragraph
three of Article 81 of the Treaty. Our Act talks both about block
exemptions (Article 5) an also singular exemptions called in our system
“Individual Authorisations from the Court” (Art. 4). In fact the possibility
to grant individual exemptions has been used by the Spanish Competition
Court, -Tribunal de Defensa de la competencia- in a very high number
of cases25. (and the Court has published several Block exemption
regulations).
The modification that has been carried out in the Spanish Act in
order to implement the Community rulings before the date of entry into
force of the Regulation 1 last first may, has not implied any change
regarding this question. That is why, when Spanish rules must be applied,
the companies will be able to go before the Spanish Competition Court
and request from him the grant of an individual exemption in application
of Spanish competition Act.
It doesn’t seem reasonable to conclude that this fact constitutes in
itself an affectation to the uniform application of the European competition
25 In fact, in the last three years we have more than 80 decisions of individual exemption.
It is interesting to analyse the web page of the Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia
http://www.mineco.es/dgdc/sdc/memorias.htm (last access 20-05-2004) where the
Annual Reports of the administrative body can be found since 1997 until 2002. In
the web page of the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia (the other administrative
body) we can find the annual reports of this institution since 1993 to 2002 http://
www.tdcompetencia.org/frames.asp?menu=2 (last access 20-05-2004).
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rules because we have to take into account and even underline that we
are only talking about the application of Spanish internal rules.
Nevertheless, and given the identity —that goes beyond the mere
likeness— between the Spanish legal system and the European one it
would be possible to think that some problems could arise.
We could imagine the case of a company that goes before the Spanish
authority to request of it an individual exemption and we could imagine
that the exemption is granted in application of the Spanish rules. This
fact could be considered as a certain guarantee for the aforementioned
company that the same authority will not consider as a reasonable
possibility that of applying against the agreement the European community
legislation that, as we already know, has the same content.
It is clear that the Spanish authority will not be able to grant a decision
of individual exemption in application of the European community
legislation. As we also know the new Regulation restricts the possibility
to grant that kind of decisions to the Commission. Even that institution
grants them ex officio, so on it’s own initiative, and only in that cases
that she considers important enough for the Community public interest
relating to the application of the articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty taking
into account a group of different things.
However the granting of the exemption in the internal market could
be considered as a certain guarantee for the company. This way, that
company could obtain a non direct guarantee of the principle of legal
certainty that, when disappearing the system of previous notification,
can be considered in issue.
It is clear that the content of the Spanish legislation finds its reason
of being in the old community regulation and not in an internal
legislator’s express will of being different of the community system.
However, if Spanish legislator would have wanted the system to be
changed he could have chosen different ways. For example, the Act
62/2003 that has been used to change some other questions and to
adapt our Act to the new model26, or the Real Decreto of 28 March
26 Ley 62/2003, of 30 December of tax, administrative and labour measures (de Medidas
Fiscales, Administrativas y del Orden Social) (BOE. nº 313, de 31 de diciembre de
2003, pp. 46934, 6992).
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200327 in which the Regulation is developed could have been considered
as appropriate tools to make that change28.
Talking about something quite different, we know that we are trying
to establish a system which ensures that the competition is not distorted
in the common market and with this aim articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty
must be applied effectively and uniformly in the Community29. We should
have to consider if this situation could cause a problem of non equal
treatment for the companies.
In certain way, we must think about that situation in the cases in
which these three different conditions are fulfilled. The first condition is
that we have a national legal system where the rules have the same
content as in the European model. The second one is that the authority
in charge of applying national law is the same that the one that has the
task of applying the Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. The last one is
that the internal procedure –inspired by the old community rules– has
not been adapted to the new situation of the R 1/03. Then the companies
27 Real Decreto de 28 de marzo de 2003, that has developed the Act 16/89 (BOE nº 90
15 de abril de 2003).
28 All the spanish legislation including a proposal of change can be found in Servicio
de defensa de la competencia http://www.mineco.es/dgdc/sdc/ (last access 20-05-
2004) and a version in english of the main legislation in the web page of the Tribunal
cit.
29 Among others, X. ARZOZ SANTISTEBAN, “Las reformas del sistema comunitario de
intervención administrativa en materia de competencia”, Revista Vasca de
Administración Pública, 2001, pp. 81 to 117; E. BANNERMAN, The future of EU
Competition Policy, Centre for European Reform, enero 2002, pp. 31-33; J.M
BENEYTO, “Hacia un nuevo derecho de la competencia. El Libro Blanco de la Comisión
sobre modernización y descentralización en la aplicación de los artículos 85 y 86”,
Gaceta Jurídica de la CE, n. 202, 1999, pp. 9 to 19; A.L., CALVO CARAVACA; M.P.,
CANEDO ARRILLAGA, “Libre competencia y descentralización”, Revista Española de
Derecho Comunitario, Ed. Civitas, nº 1, 2003, pp. 5-45; A. DERINGER, “Stellungnahme
zum Weissbuch der Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der
Vorschriften zur Anwendung der art. 85 und 86 EG-Vertrag”, Europäische Zeitschrift
für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2000, pp. 5 to 11; D. EDWARD, “Competition and the law.
Where are we going?”, Wirtschaft un Wettbewerb, 2001, pp. 1185-1190; C.D.
EHLERMAN, “Reform of European Competition Law. Coherent application of EC
Competition Law in a system of paralell competences” Freiburg 2000; C.D. EHLERMAN,
“The modernization of EC antitrust policy: a legal and cultural revolution”, Common
Market Law Review, 2000, pp. 537-590; W. FIKENTSCHER, “Das Unrecht einer
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could have a legal way to foresee with a reasonable level of legal certainty
the assessment that deserves a certain agreement or practice.
On the contrary in the States where some of this mentioned
circumstances is not fulfilled, the companies will not have the possibility
to foresee the opinion of the competent authority. They would be forced
to carry out particular studies by private legal or economic advisers
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung: Kritik an Weissbuch und VO Entwurf zu art. 81, 82
EG-Vertrag”, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerbs, 2001, pp. 446-458; A. GEIGER, “Das
Weissbuch der EG-Kommission zu Art. 81, 82 EG Eine Reform besser alr ihr Ruf”,
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht,2000, pp. 165 to 169; L. IDOT, “Le
nouveau système communautaire de mise en oeuvre des articles 81 et 82 CE
(Réglement 1/2003 et projects de textes d’application) en Cahiers de Droit Européen,
2003, nº 3-4, pp. 302-308; J. LEVER, “The german Monopolies Commission’s
Report on the Problems Consequent upon the Reform of the European Cartel
Procedures”, European Competition Law Review, julio de 2002, pp. 321 to 325;
E.J. MESTMÄCKER, “Versuch einer kartellpolitischen Wende in der EU”, Europäische
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 1999, pp. 523 to 529; W. MÖSCHEL, “Change of
Policy in the European Competition Law?”, Common Market Law Review, 2000,
pp. 495 to 499; J. NAZERALI, D. Cowan, “Modernising the Enforcement of E.U.
Competition Rules, Can the Commission claim to be preaching to the Converted?”,
European Competition Law Review, 1999, pp. 442 to 445; P. NICOLAIDES, “Reform
of EC Competition Policy: A significant but Risky Proyect”, en Eipascope, nº 2,
2002, pp. 16-24; S., REIFEGERSTE, “L’articulation du droit communautaire et du
Droit National de la Concurrence. Le règlement nº 1/2003 du Conseil du 16 décembre
2002 relatif à la mise en oeuvre des régles de concurrence prévues aux articles 81 et
82 du Traité CE”, La semaine juridique, Ed. Générale, nº 15-16, 9 avril 2003, p.
657; A. RILEY, “EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nice-
Thank you! Part One: Regulation 1 and the Notification Burden”, European
Competition Law Review, 2003, nº 11, pp. 605-606; A. RILEY, “EC Antitrust
Modernisation: The Commission Does Very Nice- Thank you! Part Two: Between
the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation 1”, European
Competition Law Review, vol. 24, nº 12, December, 2003, pp. 657-672; B.J. RODGER,
“The Commission White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles
81 and 82 E.C Treaty”, European Law Review, 1999, pp. 653 to 663; A. SCHAUB,
“Modernisation of the EC Competition Law: Reform of regulation n. 17”, Fordham
International Law Journal, Mars, 2000; A. SCHAUB, R. DOHMS, “Das Weissbuch der
Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der Vorsriften zur Anwendung
der Artikel 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag”, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 1999, pp. 1055-
1070; W. WILS, “The modernisation of the Enforcement of articles 81 and 82 EC: A
legal and economic analisys of the Commission´s proposal for a new Council
Regulation repalcing regulation n. 17”, Fordham International Law Journal, junio
2001.
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that would give them a personal interpretation of the assessment that
the practice deserves. This private advisers would base its opinion in
precedent decisions of the Commission or the Court, but will not be
able in any case to tell the opinion of the authority in charge of the
procedure –and probably sanction– of that particular case30. We
consider that this non equal treatment of the different situations could
let some companies in a non fair situation and could result in a situation
of lack of protection.
D. THE PREJUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
THE PREVAIL OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE OVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE ONE
IN THE SPANISH LEGAL ORDER
In this chapter we would like to study the relationship among the
administrative procedures that can finish in a punitive sanction and the
judicial procedures in the Spanish legal system and in special we would
like to analyse the influence of this situation in the implementing of
European Competition Law. In special we have to bear in mind Spanish
interpretation of protection of the principle of interdiction of double
jeopardy that in the continental systems is called non bis in idem31.
The new system settled down by the R 1/03 and all the Commission
notices of development, is based, as we have already studied, in a
decentralized system of parallel competence in the application of Articles
30 S. O’KEEFFE, “First among equals: the Commission and the national courts enforcers
of EC competition law”, European Law Review 2001, pp. 301-311.
31 M, BÖSE, Strafen und Sanktionen im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrect. Studien
zum Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht und Atomenergierecht. Band 94, Institut für
Volkerrecht der Universität Göttingen, Ed. Karl Heymans, Berlín, 1996, p. 175; K.
LILLICH, Das Doppelstrafverbot bei Kartelldelikten im deutchen Recht und im Recht
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Ed. Dunker & Humblot, Schriften zum
Prozeßrecht, Band. 56, Berlín, 1978, pp. 66, H.G. SCHERMERS, “Non Bis in Idem”,
F. CAPOTORTI, C.D. EHLERMANN, J. FROWEIN, F. JACOBS, R. JOLIET, T. KOOPMANS, R.
KOVAR, Du Droit International au Droit de l’integration. Liber Amicorum Pierre
Pescatore, Eds. Nomos, Baden Baden, 1987, pp. 601-612.
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81 and 82 of the Treaty. That change implies an increment in the role
that is recognised to the national authorities both administrative and
judicial protecting the public interest. The courts and tribunals of the
EU member states are called upon to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty in lawsuits between private parties and also as public enforcers32.
If we analyse the principles of allocation it is more than foreseeable
that, in some cases in which we can find a material link between the
infringement and our territory, the Spanish administrative authorities will
be considered well placed to deal with a case33 . Then the authority will
have to investigate certain behaviours that, if considered contrary to
the community rules, would be sanctioned by our national authority34.
We know also that Article 3 of the Council Regulation recognise
again, and against the proposal of 2000, the cumulative application of
national and European law (doble barrera). By means of article 3, the
same behaviour can be considered contrary to the European competition
law and also contrary to the national law35. The application of European
32 Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of
the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC Officcial Journal
C 101 27.04.2004, pp. 54-64.
33 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities
Officcial Journal C 101 27.04.2004, pp. 43-53.
34 A. PETITBO, L. BERENGUER “La aplicación del derecho de la competencia por los
órganos jurisdiccionales y administrativos” pp. 25-70; S., HIERRO ANIBARRO, “La
evolución de los órganos españoles de defensa de la competencia desde la perspectiva
del derecho comunitario”, Noticias de la UE, nº 226, noviembre de 2003, pp. 65-76.
35 A.L. CALVO, M.P. CANEDO, “Comentarios al Libro Blanco de la Comisión sobre
modernización de las normas de aplicación de los artículos 81 y 82 del TCE en
relación con el principio non bis in idem”, A.L. CALVO CARAVACA, P. BLANCO MORALES
LIMONES, Derecho europeo de la competencia, Ed. Colex, Madrid, 2000, pp. 407-
428; N. COLETTE- BASECQZ, “Une conséquence de la nature pénale de la sanction
communautaire au niveau des garanties procédurales: l’application du principe non
bis in idem”, La justice pénale et l’Europe. Travaux des XV journées d’études
juridiques Jean Dabin organisées par le Département de criminologie et de droit
pénal, Ed. Bruylant, Bruselas, 1996, pp. 463-472; G. DANNECKER, “La recente
giurisprudenza della Corte federale di giustizia sul significato dei principi ‘nullum
crimen sine lege’ e ‘ne bis in idem’ per il diritto penale e penale-amministrativo
dell’economia”, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Penale dell’Economia, Fasc. 2-3,
1990, p. 437; S. FARINELLI, “Sull’applicazione del principio ne bis in idem tra gli
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competition law can restrict but not prevent the application of national
law, in the Spanish case the Act 16/8936.
Apart from the administrative legislation, in the Spanish legal system
we have in our Criminal Code article 284 that typify and impose criminal
sanctions to certain behaviours considered contrary to the competition
because of their influence in the market and the consumers37.
The same behaviour, agreement, concerted or unilateral practice,
can therefore imply a triple infringement. Firstly an infringement to the
internal competition law with the possibility of administrative sanction
imposed by the Spanish administrative authority Spanish Competition
Court. Secondly, an infringement to the European competition law with
the possibility of administrative sanction imposed by the Commission
or a national authority that would be the same Spanish Competition
stati membri della comunità europea”, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, 1991, pp.
878-909. M. PRALUS, “Etude en droit pénal international et en droit communautaire
d’un aspect du principe non bis in idem: non bis”, Revue du Science Criminelle, nº
3, juill- sept. 1996. pp. 551-574, o J.H. ROBERT, “Application ou non application
de la regle non bis in idem entre les sanctions pénales, civiles et administratives”,
Archives de Politique Criminelle, 1984, pp. 136-144. H.G. SCHERMERS, “Non Bis in
Idem”, F. CAPOTORTI, C.D. EHLERMANN, J. FROWEIN, F. JACOBS, R. JOLIET, T. KOOPMANS,
R. KOVAR, eds. Du Droit International au Droit de l’integration. Liber Amicorum
Pierre Pescatore, Nomos, Baden Baden, 1987, pp. 601-612.
36 J. BASEDOW, “Souveraineté territorialité et globasisation des marchés: Le domaine
d’application des lois contre les restrictions de la concurrence”, Recueil des cours
de l’Academie de Droit International de La Haye, 1997, vol. 264, Ed. Marthinus
Nijhoff, La Haya, 1998, pp. 9-178; J. S., VENIT, “Brave new world: The modernization
and decentralization of enforcement under articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty”,
Common Market Law Review, nº 40, 2003, p. 545; J.P. VIENNOIS, “La portée du
droit communautaire de la concurrence et le mythe du camp d’application exclusif
du droit national”, Revue Trimmestrielle de Droit Communautaire, 2002, pp. 1 to
16; J. P. VIENNOIS, “Rapports entre droit Communautaire de la concurrence et droit
national: Les apports du réglement CE nº 1/2003 du 16 Décembre 2002”, La semaine
juridique, Entreprise et affaires, 2003, nº 5 p. 1.
37 The text of the article is “Se impondrá la pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años
o multa de 12 a 24 meses, a los que, difundiendo noticias falsas, empleando violencia,
amenaza o engaño, o utilizando información privilegiada, intentaren alterar los precios
que habrían de resultar de la libre concurrencia de productos, mercancías, títulos
valores, servicios o cualesquiera otras cosas muebles o inmuebles que sean objeto de
contratación, sin perjuicio de la pena que pudiera corresponderles por otros delitos
cometidos”.
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Court. Finally a criminal infringement with the possibility of a criminal
sanction imposed, of course, by the competent court or tribunal.
We are not going to study here the problems that could imply in our
system the cumulative application of two administrative sanctions
imposed to the same practice38. The not very clear writing of article 3
of the Council Regulation implies serious interpretation problems that
are common to all the member States.
We are going to restrict our comments to a reflection on the possible
implications that can have in our system the beginning of a criminal
prosecution39.
In our legal system and after the entry into force of the Constitution
of 1978, the interpretation that has been imposed of the principle of
double jeopardy (non bis in idem) implies a really high level of guarantee
for the parties40. Either because of historical or political reasons or
because of the youth of our system of constitutional guarantees, it can
be considered that the Spanish legal order is one of the European
systems where the fundamental rights of the individuals are respected
with more zeal. This statement is clear both from the point of view of
the law and also from the point of view of its application and
38 We could be thinking about different situations. The first one implies the implication
of two different authorities in application of different legislation (Spanish
competition court TDC in application of internal law and the Commission in
application of European law). The second one implies the implication of the same
authority in application of those mentioned rules (Spanish competition court TDC
applying national and European law).
39 T.H. WEIGEND, “The legal and practical problems posed by the difference between
criminal law and administrative law”, Revue International de Droit Penal, 1988, nº
1 and 2, p. 84.
40 J. GARBERI LLOBREGAT, El Procedimiento administrativo sancionador. Comentarios,
Jurisprudencia, Formularios y Legislación, Ed. Ed. Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia,
1994, pp. 177; E. GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, “La incidencia de la Constitución sobre la
potestad sancionadora de la Administración”, Revista Española de Administración
Pública, nº 29, 1981, p. 362; S. LORENZO, Sanciones Administrativas, Ed. Julio
César Faira, Uruguay, 1996; A., NIETO, “El principio non bis in idem”, Revista
Vasca de Administración Pública, 1990, nº 28, pp. 157-170; J. M. TRAYTER JIMENEZ,
V. AGUADO I CUDOLA, Derecho Administrativo Sancionador: Materiales, Ed. Cedes,
Derecho Administrativo, Barcelona, 1995, pp. 71-88; J.J.QUERALT, El Principio
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interpretation41 . This remark can be applied to the rights of defence
and principles that inspire all the procedure that could finish in an
administrative sanction, and must be even underlined dealing with the
respect of the mentioned principle of double jeopardy (non bis in
idem)42. We can conclude that our legal system implies a higher
level of guarantee than the one of the Council of Europe Rome
Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of 195043.
Art. 6 of that mentioned Convention restricts the protection of the
principle to the criminal proceedings44. However, after the famous
judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in case ÖZTÜRK45,
we have an independent concept of “criminal matters” that lets us apply
that principles, under certain conditions, to the punitive administrative
non bis in idem, Ed. Tecnos, Colección Jurisprudencia Práctica, Madrid, 1992, p. 9;
S. REY GUANTER, Potestad sancionadora de la Administración y jurisdicción penal
en el orden social, 1990, p. 111.
41 The historical and political reasons are analysed by F.J. LEÓN VILLALBA, Acumulación
de sanciones penales y administrativas, Sentido y alcance del principio ne bis in
idem, Ed. Bosch, Barcelona, 1998, pp. 31-77.
42 F. SANZ GANDASEGUI, La potestad sancionadora de la Administración: la Constitución
española y el Tribunal Constitucional, Ed. Revista de Derecho Privado, Madrid,
1985, p. 129.
43 T. MERON, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary law, Ed. Claredon
Paperbacks, Oxford, 1991, p. 97; H.G. SCHERMERS, “Non Bis in Idem”, Du Droit
International au Droit de l’integration. Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore, F.
CAPOTORTI, C.D. EHLERMANN, J. FROWEIN, F. JACOBS, R. JOLIET, T. KOOPMANS, R.
KOVAR, Ed. Nomos, Baden Baden, 1987, p. 607; COUNCIL OF EUROPE. The
administration and you. Principles of administrative law concerning the relations
between administrative authorities and private persons. A handbook, Ed. Council
of Europe Publishing, 1996, p. 30.
44 R. GARCIA ALBERO, ‘Non bis in idem’ Material y Concurso de Leyes Penales, Ed.
Cedes, Derecho penal, Barcelona, 1995, p. 88.
45 Judgement of February 21 1984. Publications of the European Court of Human
Rights, Series A, vol. 73. The matter deals with a Turkish citizen in Germany, that
appealed before the tribunals a monetary sanction that had been imposed applying
the Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten 1968, because of a traffic infringement. Mr.
Öztürk alleged violation of the guarantees of the article 6.3 CEDH and, when being
rejected its pretense before the internal tribunals it appealed before the European
Commission of Human rights.
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sanctions46. The sanctions that can be imposed in competition law can
be considered without any doubt within that group47. Anyway, and
considering that the mentioned application is possible, the prohibition
of double jeopardy is considered respected when the second sanction
imposed takes into consideration the first one in order to respect the
46 M. DELMAS MARTY, C. TEITGEN COLLY, Punir sans Juger? De la Répresion
Administrative au Droit Administrartif Pénal, Ed. Economica, París, 1992, p. 100;
M. G. RUBIO DE CASAS, “Potestad sancionatoria de la administración y garantía del
administrado. Comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos
de 21 de febrero de 1984: el caso Ötztürk”, Revista de administración pública, nº
104 1984, pp. 375 and 390; L.E. PETTITI, “Les principes généraux de droit pénal
dans la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme”, Revue de Science Criminelle
et de Droit Pénal Comparé, vol. 1, enero-marzo, 1987, p. 174; J. PRALUS-DUPUY,
“L’article 6 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et les
contentieux de la répresion disciplinaire”, Revue du Science Criminelle, nº 4, 1995,
pp. 723-749.
47 J. BIANCARELLI, “Les Principes généraux du Droit communautaire applicables en
matière pénale”, Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Pénal Comparé, 1987, pp.
131-166; M. DELMAS MARTY, C. TEITGEN COLLY, “France. Vers un droit administratif
pénal?”, Etude sur les systèmes de sanction administratives et pénales dans les
Etats membres des communautés européennes, Ed. Commission des Communautés
Européennes, Bruselas, 1994, p. 210; C. HARDING, European Community
Investigations and Sanctions. The Supranational Control of Bussiness Delinquency,
Ed. Leicester University Press, Londres, 1993, p. 123; H. JOHANNES, “Le droit
pénal et son harmonisation dans les Communautés européennes”, Revue Trimestrielle
de Droit Européen, 1971, p. 347; K. LENAERTS, I. MASELIS, “Procedural rights and
issues in the enforcement of the articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty”, en Fordham
International Law Journal, junio 2001; A. NIETO MARTÍN, “Aspectos de la protección
penal y sancionadora de la libre competencia”, Estudios de Derecho Penal
Económico, Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Madrid, 1994, pp.
111-137; A. NIETO MARTIN, Fraudes Comunitarios Fraudes Comunitarios. Derecho
Penal Económico Europeo, Ed. Praxis, Barcelona, 1996, p. 167; A. NIETO MARTÍN,
“Ordenamiento comunitario y derecho penal económico español. Relaciones en el
presente y en el futuro”, Administración Pública, nº 34, septiembre 1995, p. 607;
K. TIEDEMANN, “Europäishes Gemeinschaftsrecht und Strafrecht”, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift, 1993, p. 29; J.A.E VERVAELE, “Procédures communautaires: enquête
et mise en œuvre des sanctions”, M. DELMAS MARTY, Quelle politique pénale por
l’Europe, Ed. Economica, 1993, p. 256; R. WINKLER, Die Rechtsnatur del Geldbuße
im der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Ein beitrag zum Wirtschaftsstrafrecht
der Europäischen gemeinschaften, Ed. J.C.B. Mohr, Tubinga, 1971, p. 100.
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principle of proportionality48. That is the same interpretation that the
Court of Justice of the European Union has applied in all the cases
since its historical judgement WALT WILHELM49.
That interpretation is not accepted in the Spanish legal order50. In
our system the principle of prohibition of double jeopardy receives an
interpretation really wider than the one that we have just referred, and
that, with two different meanings51.
Firstly, in our system the interest protected by the norm that contains
the infringement and sanction has absolutely no importance. That is
why in Spain is not possible to sanction the same behaviour twice
applying two different rules even if the legal interests protected by them
are not the same. We must highlight that we consider that the principle
48 J.H. ROBERT, “Application ou non application de la regle non bis in idem entre les
sanctions pénales, civiles et administratives”, Archives de Politique Criminelle,
1984, p. 144; D. SPINELLIS, “The legal and practical problems posed by the difference
between criminal law and administrative law”, Revue International de Droit Penal,
1988, p. 223
49 Case T-14/68, 13 february 1969, Walt Wilhelm v Commission of the European
Communities, ECR. 1969-I, p. 15, Advocate General ROEMER. This judgement
begins a jurisprudence that has not changed until the more recent C-238/99 P, C-
244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P 15
October 2002, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM), DSM NV and DSM
Kunststoffen BV, Montedison SpA, Elf Atochem SA, Degussa AG, Enichem SpA,
Wacker-Chemie GmbH, Hoechst AG, Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI)/
Comisión, Rec. 2002, para. 54-69. R.H. LAUWAARS, “Annotation”, Common Market
Law Review, 1969, pp. 489-490; M. ZULEEG, “Der Rang des europäischen im
Verhältnis zum nationalen Wettbewerbsrecht”, Europarecht, 1990, pp. 123-134;
U.B. HENRIKSEN, Anti-competitive State Measures in the European Community. An
Analysis of the Decisions of the European Court of Justice, Ed handelshojskolens,
Dinamarca, 1994, p. 21; C. HOOTZ, “Anmerkung”, Europarecht, 1969, pp. 151-
153, J. BOULOUIS, R.M. CHEVALIER, Grands arrets de la Cour de Justice des
Communnautes europeennes, tomos I y II, Ed. Dalloz Sirey, 1983, p. 249.
50 Vid. A.L., CALVO CARAVACA; M.P., CANEDO ARRILLAGA, “El principio non bis in idem
en Derecho Comunitario de Defensa de la competencia” in A.L., CALVO CARAVACA;
P., BLANCO MORALES, Derecho Comunitario de Defensa de la Competencia, Ed.
Colex, Madrid, 2000, pp. 407-429; L. CASES PALLARES, Derecho Administrativo de
la Defensa de la Competencia, Ed. Marcial Pons, Madrid, 1995, p. 62.
51 A. NIETO GARCÍA, Derecho administrativo sancionador, Ed. Tecnos, 2ª edición,
Madrid, 1994, p. 398; J. SUAY RINCÓN, Sanciones administrativas, Ed. Publicaciones
del Real Colegio de España, Bolonia, 1989.
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of double jeopardy can be imposed in different criminal proceedings,
in different administrative procedures and even when the problem is
created with a criminal procedure with an administrative one. A criminal
sanction has not as a consequence that of reduction of the administrative
one, it simply prevents it52.
To avoid unfair solutions, our model contains a system of preference
of the criminal proceedings. It takes into account that the interests
protected by the criminal rules are more outstanding or important, and
that is the reason why if we have a criminal infringement, the criminal
procedure must take place and then this procedure prevails53.
We have even some examples, really exceptional indeed, of
judgements in which bad functioning of the administration of justice has
as a consequence that the administrative procedure takes place firstly
and concluding in a sanction. That extreme situation prevents the
possibility to carry out the criminal proceeding54.
52 But in the situations in which the rules have different scope and objective. See the
decision of the Spanish Competition Court (Expte 557/03 cit.)
53 J.J GONZÁLEZ RIVAS, Las Sanciones Administrativas en la Doctrina Jurisprudencial
del Tribunal Constitucional, del Tribunal Supremo, de la Audiencia Nacional y de
los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia, Ed. Actualidad, 1994, p. 44; J. GONZÁLEZ
PÉREZ, Comentarios a la Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo, Ed. Civitas, Madrid,
1991, p. 1267; A. LUCIANO PAREJO, A. JIMÉNEZ BLANCO, L. ORTEGA ÁLVAREZ, Manual
de Derecho Administrativo, Ed. Ariel Derecho, Barcelona, 1990, p. 251, E. RIVERA
TEMPRANO, “Principios de la potestad sancionadora en la ley 30/92”, Cuadernos de
Derecho Judicial. Estudio de la L.R.J. de las administraciones públicas y del
procedimiento administrativo común, tomo II, Ed. Consejo General del Poder Judicial,
Madrid, abril de 1994, pp. 173-175; J.M. TRAYTER, “El principio non bis in idem en
la jurisprudencia”, Poder Judicial, nº 22, 1991; A. PRIETO SANCHIS, “La jurisprudencia
constitucional y el problema de las sanciones administrativas en el Estado de
Derecho”, Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, nº 4, 1982, pp. 115; A.
DOMÍNGUEZ VILA, Constitución y Derecho Sancionador Administrativo, Ed. Gobierno
de Canarias, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 1997.
54 C. FERNÁNDEZ CANALES, “Potestad sancionadora de la Administración Pública y
Principio non bis in idem. Comentario a la STS (Sala 3ª Secc. 7ª) de 7 de julio de
1992”, La Ley, 1992-4, p. 515; A. MUÑOZ QUIROGA, “El Principio non bis in idem.
Comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional de 3 de octubre de 1983,
recurso de amparo”, Civitas Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo, enero-
marzo 1985, nº 45, pp. 129-142.
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Secondly, in the Spanish legal order the principle of interdiction of
double jeopardy implies not only a prohibition of double sanction, but
even implies a prohibition of double prosecution. The purpose of the
principle is not only to reduce the quantity of the sanctions, or to take
them into consideration in order to guarantee the principle of
proportionality of the final sanction. Its purpose is to avoid or prevent a
second procedure for the same facts that have already been analysed55.
If we try to put together this interpretation of the principle of
interdiction of double jeopardy, the parallel application of European
and national competition law and the content of our internal law we can
easily think of important problems.
We could think about a hypothetic situation. Suppose that the Spanish
Competition Court begins a procedure in order to enforce the Spanish
competition rules. Studding the facts, the Spanish NCA reaches the
conclusion that the same practices can also imply a criminal infringement
and, if it is the case, a criminal sanction. In that situation, without any
doubt, the Spanish Competition court (that is, we must remember, an
administrative authority) would put an end to its procedure. The Spanish
authority would respect the preference of the jurisdiction of the criminal
court that should have to carry out the prosecution of the behaviour
(art. 55 of the Spanish Competition Act). The respect to the principle
of interdiction of double jeopardy would prevent the administrative
authority to continue with the procedure even once finished the criminal
prosecution. Therefore the criminal sanction prevents the administrative
sanction.
We can not think of any reason that would impel the administrative
Spanish authority to change this interpretation when she has to enforce
European law to a practice. The problem in this situation would be that
the solution given by the Spanish administrative authority (the Spanish
Competition Court) would be absolutely different from the one that
would give other national authorities. Due to the different interpretation
of the principle of interdiction of double jeopardy existing in other legal
55 E.C. MANZANO MORENO, “El ilícito penal y el administrativo, el principio non bis in
idem y la jurisprudencia”, Boletín de información del Ministerio de Justicia, 15 de
junio 1985, nº 1386, pp. 3-14.
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orders –for example but not only the French one56– the infringement
would deserve a different treatment depending on the national authority
competent. The solution would be also different if the Commission would
decide to initiate proceedings in order to apply articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty.
Could we consider that the principle of uniform application of
European competition law is guaranteed in this situation and taking into
consideration that the same practice can be sanctioned because of
breach of arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty by some national authorities or
the Commission and not by other national authorities (in our case the
Spanish one)? Couldn’t we have in this situation a problem of forum
shopping among the different national authorities when the complainants
try to avoid the competence of the authorities of States that are more
protecting with the rights of the companies? would it not be possible on
the contrary that the companies could begin criminal procedures in some
cases when they consider that the sanction would not be of special
importance only trying to avoid the imposition of an administrative
sanction that could reach a very important quantity? Is it foreseeable
that in that situation, –not taking into account the principles of allocation
of the Notice of the Commission creating the Network- the Commission
or another internal authority would consider that is better placed to
carry out the procedure in order to avoid that the competence of a
national authority and consequent application of the internal law of that
country make impossible the application of the sanction based in the
European Law? Would it be acceptable then for the companies to follow
a procedure with non respect of the procedural guarantees that would
have been respected by its internal authority? All these questions are at
the moment without any answer.
56 N. COLETTE-BASECQZ, “Une conséquence de la nature pénale de la sanction
communautaire au niveau des garanties procédurales: l’application du principe non
bis in idem”, La justice pénale et l’Europe. Travaux des XV journées d’études
juridiques Jean Dabin organisées par le Département de criminologie et de droit
pénal, Ed. Bruylant, Bruselas, 1996, p. 465; F. MODERNE, Sanctions administratives
et justice constitutionelle. Contribution à l’etude du jus puniendi de l’Etat dans les
démocraties contemporaines, Ed. Economica, París, 1993, p. 268; F. MODERNE,
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E. THE APPLICATION OF THE LENIENCY PROGRAMS
IN THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM
In the Spanish legal order we have by the moment no programs of
leniency57. We know that some of the European Union States have
developed those mentioned programs, so we could have expected the
development in our country. However in our legal order that kind of
programs could be problematic for different circumstances.
Firstly, in the Spanish legal system and, due to the administrative
character of the Spanish competition Court, the procedure is governed
Sanctions administratives et justice constitutionelle. Contribution à l’etude du jus
puniendi de l’Etat dans les démocraties contemporaines, Ed. Economica, París,
1993, p. 268; J. MOURGEON, La répression administrative, Ed. L.G.D.J., París,
1967, p. 277; J. PRALUS-DUPUY, “Cumul et non Cumul de Sanctions en Droit
Disciplinaire”, Recueil Dalloz, 1993, 19º Cahier, Chonique, pp. 135-140; C. TEITGEN
COLLY, “Sanctions administratives et autorités administratives indépendantes”, Les
Petites Affiches, 17 enero 1990, nº 8, p. 39; A. VARINARD, E. JOLY-SIBUET, “Les
problemes juridiques et pratiques posés par la difference entre le droit pénal et le
droit administratif pénal”, Revue International de Droit Penal, 1988, p. 209.
In other scopes of application, vid. M. DELMAS-MARTY, “Rapport géneral. XIVth
International Congress on Penal Law”, Revue International de Droit Pénal, vol. 59,
1988, pp. 27-64; E. DOLCINI, “Les problemes juridiques et pratiques posées par la
difference entre le droit criminel et le droit administratif penal”, Revue International
de Droit Pénal, 1988, nº 1-2, p. 290; EUROPEAN COMMISSION Etude sur les systèmes de
sanction administratives et pénales dans les Etats membres des communautés
européennes, Ed. Commission des Communautés Européennes, Bruselas, 1994; J.
FARIA COSTA, J., “Rapport au colloque de Stockholm. Les problemes juridiques et
pratiques posés par la différence entre le droit criminel et le droit administratif
pénal”, Revue International de Droit Penal, 1988, nº 1-2, p. 347; G. GRASSO, “Nuove
prospettive in tema di sanzioni amministrative comunitarie”, Rivista Italiana di
Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, nº 5, 1994, pp. 870-872; O. LAGODNY,
“Teileuropäisches ne bis in idem durch Art. 54 des Schengener
Durchfürungsübereinkommen (SDU)”, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 1997, 15 junio
1997, pp. 265-266; A.M. SANDULLI, Le sanzioni amministrative pecuniarie, Ed.
Jovene, Napoles, 1983, p. 133.
57 In the web page of the Commission one can find a list of the EU Member states that
can operate a Leniency Programme. Of course Spain is not there because of the
reassons we have highlited. Vid. Commission of the European Union http://
e u r o p a . e u . i n t / c o m m / c o m p e t i t i o n / a n t i t r u s t / l e g i s l a t i o n /
authorities_with_leniency_programme.pdf (last access may 2004).
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by the general rules on administrative procedure (art. 50 Spanish
Competition Act). The mentioned rules establish as one of the governing
principles of all Spanish administrative procedure, the principle of legality
of the Administration. In fact this principle is considered a guarantee of
the individuals that protects them against the power of discretion of the
Administration. That principle would prevent the administration in our
system to admit a complaint conditioned to the informer’s impunity.
The most similar thing that we have in our system would be the
system called of conventional termination of the procedure (art. 36 bis
of the Spanish Competition Act)58. That mentioned article foresee the
possibility to reach an agreement among the individual and the
Administration that puts an end to the procedure and imply a reduction
of the sanction imposed if a voluntary payment of the sanction agreement
takes place before the moment of adoption of the final decision59.
It is important to underline that the application of the legality principle
is not against the application of what we call principio de oportunidad
that governs the Spanish administrative procedure exactly the same as
the European one (art. 1.3 Spanish Competition Act)60. In application
of that principle, the administration could decide not to begin
proceedings due to reasons of general interest. They retain full discretion
in deciding whether or not to investigate a case. This possibility does
not seem to be, in our opinion, a good way to solve the problem that
we have outlined.
In special because we have to take into account that the system of
leniency seeks to begin procedures that conclude in the sanction of the
most serious infringements to the rules of competition law. That is why
58 M. PEDRAZ, “Cuestiones que plantea la aplicación en España de los sistemas de
clemencia en defensa de la competencia”, Anuario de Competencia, 2002, pp. 327-
362.
59 See also the art. 88 of Act 30/92 that contains the general procedure of the
Administration in Spain. Also, the art. 8 of the Real Decreto 1398/1993, foresee the
end of the procedure and a reduction of sanctions but not impunity.
60 J.C. FOURGOUX, “L’exercise du pouvoir discretionnaire de la Commission des
Communnautés européennes en matière de concurrence. Tentative d’extension et
coup de frein par la juridiction communautaire”, Revue de Science Criminelle, 2002,
pp. 599-603.
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we do not consider as a reasonable possibility in fact that of foreseeing
as the best solution the inactivity of the administrative authority.
On the other hand with this system we could not guarantee impunity
for the complainant. If we do not have a procedure, we will not be able
to guarantee that the administration will not modify its view of he situation
by means of the respect to the interdiction of double jeopardy. This
option would only be possible if, as in the European system, the
complainant was acquitted and, as we have seen, that is not possible in
our system.
As another problem related to this situation, we have to take into
account that, as we said before, in our legal system we have criminal
rules dealing with anticompetitive measures and that situation would
also be considered problematic with a hypothetical program of leniency.
With this situation the complainant before an administrative authority,
must take into consideration that he can be considered as self-charged
in those behaviours that could imply a criminal sanction. In our legal
system if an administrative authority have knowledge of some practices
that could deserve a criminal sanction, that authority would have to let
the competent criminal court know about the facts.
In the criminal field the solution to our problem, far from being easier,
is somehow more complicated. In this field we have in Spain an internal
rule of the Public Prosecution Service (1989) that settles down what
we call the principle of consensus61. In accordance with that rule, the
individual that recognises facts that can be considered as a crime and
admit the penalty can see the sanction reduced. Furthermore, in order
to make this solution possible, and if a third person is part in proceedings,
that third person must accept the agreement and the accused person
must also assume the civil liability directly derived of the crime. Even in
that case, the court can not make the sanction disappear.
61 See the judgement of the Tribunal de lo Penal of Madrid of 21 January 2003 in
application of the art. 285 of our Criminal Code.
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Keeping in mind that the administrative authority is forced to stay
the proceedings when a criminal procedure begins, it is difficult to imagine
how a program of leniency could be settled down in Spain and this
situation takes us again before a problem of forum shopping.
Is it necessary to think about the possible uniform application of the
European competition law when in some states one can follow a program
of leniency and in other states this situation is not possible? will not this
situation decide the complainants to go before the authorities of those
states in which this possibility exists instead of going to the best placed
to deal with the case if these do not have these advantages? Could an
authority that has received the complaint consider that another authority
of the Net is better placed to deal with the case and decline jurisdiction
to carry out the prosecution? What could be the consequences of that
situation in relation with the leniency programs? In what situation would
this leave the complainant that is member of the agreements? Would be
perhaps the Commission the one who should deal with the case to
avoid the leniency applicant’s lack of protection?
Finally this question outlines another query. The Notice on the
cooperation within the Network of competition authorities settles down
that the competition authorities will transmit to the other members of
the Network with the consent of the applicant. In such cases, however,
information submitted to the network will not be used by the other
members of the network as the basis for starting an investigation on
their own behalf whether under the competition rules of the treaty or in
the case of national authorities under the national competition laws
(administrative or criminal in our legal order) or other laws (like for
example the legislation on tax law)62.
In the same Notice we have a group of situations in which the consent
of the applicant for the transmission of information to other authorities
of the network is not considered necessary. The first one talks about
the situations in which the national authority has also received a leniency
application relating to the same infringement from the same applicant as
the transmitting authority. The second one deals directly with the national
62 See pr. 39 of the Commission Notice. cit.
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authority. If the national authority has provided a written commitment
that neither the information transmitted to it nor any other information it
may obtain, will be used by it or by any other authority to which the
information is subsequently transmitted to impose sanctions. a) on the
leniency applicant; b) on any other legal or natural person covered by
the favourable treatment offered by the transmitting authority as a result
of the application made by the applicant under its leniency programme;
c) on any employee or former employee of any of the persons covered
by a) or b).
In the Spanish legal system this commitment could not be provided
due to the principle of legality that, as we have already explained, governs
the administrative procedure. For that reason we think that we could
already consider to the Spanish NCA as outside of the information that
other authorities receive in exercise of the programs of leniency63.
However, we have to outline that the Notice of the Commission
doesn’t avoid, at least expressly, the possibility to transmit the information
to those authorities that, committed not to impose sanctions, could
however have the obligation of informing to other authorities, for
example of the commission of a crime.
This way the Notice of the Commission would be protecting the
applicant against the application of the national competition law
neglecting the possibility that he could be subject of more serious
sanctions including the criminal ones.
V. CONCLUSION
Even if we must conclude that from an institutional point of view Spanish
legal system is well positioned to implement the new european model of
control of the practices against the competition, we must underline that
an important group of problems are now without solution.
63 In fact the web page of the Commission contains information over the Countries
that have provided the commitment and Spain is not in the list. Comisión http://
e u r o p a . e u . i n t / c o m m / c o m p e t i t i o n / a n t i t r u s t / l e g i s l a t i o n /
list_of_authorities_joint_statement.pdf (last access 20- may 2004).
Perhaps, as with the ancient R. 17, is in practice of the Commission
and control of the European Court of Justice where the practitioners
will have to look for these solutions. Perhaps risk of forum shopping
and protection against double jeopardy are the most important. Once
again, principle of efficient application of the rules by the authorities has
been considered as more important as legal certainty for the companies.
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